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law studied by the individual up to that time. The weight to be
given the grade received in a comprehensive examination has not
yet been determined.
Another innovation will be an experiment with "reading
courses" in a limited number of elective subjects. These will be
taught by assigned readings in cases and text materials. Class
meetings may be held, at the option of the instructor, to clarify
parts of the material and to answer questions. An examination
will be given at the end of each reading course.
The purpose in moving study of Administrative Law and the
beginning of Equity study to the first year of law training is to
give the student at the most formative period of his law school
experience a complete picture of the legal system as it functions
in law, in equity and before administrative tribunals, and thereby
enable him better to understand the courses that follow.
Combining Trusts, Wills, Future Interests and Estate and Gift
Taxation into one course is designed to give a more complete pic-
ture of and a more practical approach to estate planning than is
possible when these subjects are taught in separate courses.
The comprehensive examinations are intended to add incentive
to review, help emphasize the interrelation between "branches" of
the law and give additional training in analysis of legal problems.
Through the reading courses the student is expected to increase
his proficiency and confidence in "learning" a field of law with
little outside aid-a task which he must eventually face in many
fields of law not covered during his law school experience.
Who May Complain in a Federal Court
of an Unlawful Search and Seizure
IN McDonald v. United States,' the most recent decision of the
Supreme Court dealing with search and seizure, the court was
faced with the question of who may move to suppress evidence
which has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
While lower federal courts have developed a considerable body of
law on the subject, the question had not heretofore been passed on
directly by the United States Supreme Court. It is the aim of the
writer to evaluate the McDonald decision in the light of the prior
federal cases.
The facts in the McDonald case were as follows: Federal
officers suspecting McDonald of engaging in the numbers racket,
1335 U. S. 451, 69 Sup. Ct. 191 (1948).
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stood watch outside the house where he roomed. Upon hearing
what was thought to be an adding machine, one of the officers
opened a front window leading into the landlady's bedroom and
climbed through. Pushing the startled woman aside, he went to
the front door and admitted his fellows. They then searched the
rooms on the ground floor and some of the rooms on the second
floor. Seeing a closed door at the end of the second floor hallway,
one of the officers climbed on a chair to look through the transom.
He saw McDonald and Washington, his guest, operating an add-
ing machine. Money and policy slips were piled on the table beside
them. At the officer's demand McDonald opened the door, and
he and Washington were arrested. Two adding machines, money,
and a suitcase full of policy slips were seized from the room.
The two men were subsequently convicted of violating the
gambling laws of the District of Columbia. Before trial McDonald
had moved for the return and suppression in evidence of the
articles seized, but the motion had been denied. On appeal both
McDonald and Washington charged error in the denial of the
motion. The conviction was affirmed by a divided Court of Ap-
peals.2 That court held that there had been an unlawful entry
into the house, but that no rights of defendant McDonald were
violated, because his room was not searched prior to the time of
his arrest. The dissenting judge was of the opinion that McDon-
ald's rights had been violated by the officers in spying on him from
the corridor under the circumstances. All members of the court
apparently conceded that Washington, as a mere guest on the
premises, could not complain.
The Supreme Court, with three judges dissenting,' reversed
the convictions of both defendants. The majority held that Mc-
Donald's constitutional rights were violated, and that he was a
proper party to move for the suppression of the evidence. Further,
the court held that Washington was prejudiced by the denial of
McDonald's motion because the evidence would not have been
available at Washington's trial had the motion been granted.
The Fourth Amendment itself does not specifically provide that
2McDonald v. United States, 166 F. 2d 957 (App. D.C. 1948).
3Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the court. Justice Black concurred in
the result. Justice Rutledge concurred in the opinion relating to McDonald,
and in the result. He felt that the evidence, having been unlawfully obtained,
should have been suppressed as to both-apparently whether prejudicial to
Washington or not. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the opinion of the court and the concurring opinion
of Jackson. Justice Burton dissented on the ground that there was no search
of McDonald's room. Justices Vinson and Reed concurred in the dissent.
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evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure may not
be used against a defendant in a federal court.4 The Supreme Court
in the case of Weeks v. United States,; however, feeling that the
guarantees of the Constitution could be given effective operation
only if federal courts refused to admit evidence so seized, held
that such evidence should be suppressed upon a timely motion by
the defendant. The lower federal courts in applying the rule of
the Weeks case have put several restrictions upon it.6 One of these
restrictions is that only the person whose rights had been violated
by the unlawful search and seizure can move for the suppression
of the evidence.! The Supreme Court has never expressly sanc-
tioned this restriction,8 but it has been codified by an act of
Congress.'
4U. S. CONsT. AmEND. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... "
5232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
68 WIoGMoI, EVIDENCE § 2184a (3rd ed. 1940).
7Leading cases are Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932);
Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795 (C.C.A. 7th 1920). In the Connolly
case is an excellent discussion of the rationale behind the rule. The court
pointed out that suppression of the evidence is granted in order to give the de-
fendant a complete remedy for the wrong done by the police. One who has
not been wronged is entitled to no remedy.
8The closest the Supreme Court ever came to recognizing the rule was in
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114, 121, 62 Sup. Ct. 1000, 1004 (1942),
"While this court has never been called upon to decide the point, the federal
courts in numerous cases, and with unanimity, have denied standing to one
not the victim of an unconstitutional search and seizure to object to the intro-
duction in evidence of that which was seized .... We think no broader sanction
should be imposed ... in respect of violations of the Communications Act".
9The Fed. R. Cr. P., 41(e), 54 Stat. 688 (1940), 18 U.S.C.A. 687 (Supp.
1946): "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
district court ... for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evi-
dence anything so obtained .... If the notion is granted the property shall be
restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admis-
sable in evidence in any hearing or trial." The notes of the Advisory Committee
on Rules expressly state that this section, with one exception not pertinent here,
was meant to codify the existing law and practice prevailing in the federal
courts. In the principal case, the Supreme Court did not construe the statute;
it did not cite the statute. It has been construed by two lower federal courts.
In United States v. Janitz, 6 F.R.D. 1 (D.NJ. 1946), dismissed for want of
appellate jurisdiction in Janitz v. U. S., 161 F. 2d 19 (C.C.A. 3rd 1946), the
court held that the statute broadened the existing law so that evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be used in any hearing
or trial regardless of who objected. The construction adopted by the District
Court in the Janitz case was rejected in Lagow v. United States, 159 F. 2d 245(C.C.A. 2d 1946), where the court said at 246, "We read the phrase, 'a party




Thus when a defendant moves for the suppression of evidence
the question arises: Were his constitutional rights violated by the
unlawful search and seizure?"
To illustrate the issue, consider this extreme situation: Federal
officers, without a warrant or probable cause, search the home of
Smith. During the course of the search they find and seize a gun
which tends to connect Jones with a bank robbery committed
several months before. Jones is indicted for the robbery and he
moves for the suppression of the gun in evidence. It is shown that
he has no connection whatsoever with Smith or his house; and
that Smith bought the gun from a pawn broker to whom Jones
had sold it. It is safe to say that no federal court would grant this
motion." It would be denied on the ground that no constitutional
right of Jones was violated by the unlawful search and seizure. 2
Courts are not usually faced with such clear cut cases. Gen-
erally there is some relationship existing between the defendant
who makes the motion and the premises searched, or the property
seized, or the person whose rights were violated. The situations
in which the question arises may be divided into ten categories.
1. DEFENDANT Is OWNER OF THE PREMISES SEARCHED BUT Is
NOT IN POSSESSION.
An owner of premises who has given possession to a third party
is in no position to complain of a search of such premises by way
of a motion to suppress evidence.' He does not show that his
rights under the Fourth Amendment have been violated merely
by showing that he had legal title to the premises searched.
'
0The following secondary authorities are helpful in answering this question:
CORNELrUS, Tim LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 14 (2d ed. 1930); 8 WioRolE,
EVIDENCE § 2184a (3rd ed. 1940); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures,
34 HARV. L. Rv. 361, 374-76 (1920); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the
Law of Search and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1928); Fraenkel, Recent Develop-
ments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472, 490-91
(1948); Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 561 (1933); 56 C.J., Search and Seizure §§ 54-
63; See Notes, 24 A.L.R. 1408, 1425 (1923); 32 A.L.R. 408, 415 (1924); 41
A.L.R. 1145, 1151 (1926); 52 A.L.R. 477, 487 (1928); 78 A.L.R. 343 (1932);
86 A.L.R. 346 (1933); 88 A.L.R. 348, 365 (1934); 134 A.L.R. 819, 831 (1941);
150 A.L.R. 566, 577 (1944).
"With the one exception perhaps of the court which decided the case of
United States v. Janitz, 6 F.R.D. 1, (D. N.J. 1946). See note 11 supra.
28See Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795, 803-04 (C.C.A. 7th 1920).
13United States v. Dellaro, 99 F. 2d 781 (C.C.A. 2d 1938); United States v.
Muscarelle, 63 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d 1933); Chepo v. United States, 46 F. 2d
70 (C.C.A. 3rd 1930); Cantrell v. United States, 15 F. 2d 953 (C.C.A. 5th
1926); DriskiUl v. United States, 281 Fed. 146 (C.C.A. 9th 1922). See Thomas v.
United States, 154 F. 2d 365 (C.C.A. 10th 1946); Schnitzer v. United States,
77 F. 2d 233 (C.C.A. 8th 1925).
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2. DEFENDANT IS IN POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES SEARCHED.
If one is in possession of the premises, then his constitutional
rights are violated by an unlawful search of such premises. 4 . This
is true whether he occupies the premises as owner"5 or as a tenant. 6
It may be true even though he is a trespasser." If his rights as the
occupant were violated by the search, he may move for the sup-
pression even though the property seized was not his property. 8
It is suggested that he should have the right to complain even
though the property seized was in the actual possession of another
on his premises.
It may be concluded that what the courts seek to protect under
the Fourth Amendment is primarily the peaceful enjoyment of one's
premises rather than the rights of ownership. Indeed, the guaran-
tees of the Fourth Amendment have come to be termed the guar-
antees of privacy.'9
3. DEFENDANT IS IN POSSESSION OF A PORTION OF THE
PREMISES SEARCHED
The cases within this group2" may be divided into three classes,
14Few cases have given much discussion to this phase of the problem. If the
search of the premises is found to be unreasonable it is usually assumed with-
out question that the rights of the party in possession have been violated and
that he is therefore in a position to move for suppression of the evidence. The
following cases directly or indirectly sustain the proposition: Gibson v. United
States, 149 F. 2d 381 (App. D.C. 1945); Mathews v. Correa, 135 F. 2d 534
(C.C.A. 2d 1943); United States v. Edelson, 83 F. 2d 405 (C.C.A. 2d 1936);
Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 8th 1932); Klee v. United States,
53 F. 2d 58 (C.C.A. 9th 1931); Cofer v. United States, 37 F. 2d 677 (C.C.A. 5th
1930); Alvau v. United States, 33 F. 2d 467 (C.C.A. 9th 1929); United States v.
Hotchkiss, 60 F. Supp. 405 (D. Md. 1945); United States v. Antonelli Fire-
works Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. N.Y. 1943); United States v. Esposito, 45 F.
Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Note that in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S.
699, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1948), all of the defendants were lessees of the barn
in question.
1sAlvau v. United States, 33 F. 2d 467 (C.C.A. 9th 1929).
16United States v. Edelson, 83 F. 2d 405 (C.C.A. 2d 1936).
17Klee v. United States, 53 F. 2d 58 (C.C.A. 9th 1931) would indicate that
a trespasser in possession could not complain of the unlawful entry and search,
but the case of Stakich v. United States, 24 F. 2d 701 (C.C.A. 9th 1928) indi-
cates that a trespasser might complain if the evidence was unlawfully seized
from the portion of the premises which he was actually possessing.
'sUnited States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. N.Y,
1943); see Mathews v. Correa, 135 F. 2d 534 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
19". .. the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police .... It was done so that an objective mind might weigh
the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy
was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the
detection of crime ...... McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455, 69
Sup. Ct. 191, 193 (1948).20Brown v. United States, 83 F. 2d 383 (C.C.A. 3d 1936); United States v.
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depending upon the nature of the premises and the portion occu-
pied by the defendant.
In the first class the premises consist of a dwelling house which
defendant occupies in part as a roomer or a tenant on one of the
floors. In Brown v. United States"' two of the defendants, roomers
in the home of Mrs. Gillman, moved for the suppression of evi-
dence seized during an unlawful search of the house. The house
had been thoroughly searched from cellar to attic; their rooms
were apparently searched along with the rest. The appellate court
reversed the convictions because the motion was denied. The court
said that these defendants "were roomers in the house. It was their
home, and so far as the unlawful search affected them it violated
their constitutional rights."22 The language of the court in regard
to these defendants is somewhat cautious, and one may conclude
no more from it than that the constitutional rights of a roomer
are violated when his room has been unlawfully invaded and
searched.
The Court of Appeals in the principal case of McDonald v.
United States23 said that McDonald's constitutional rights had not
been violated because there had been no search of his room prior to
his lawful arrest. The Supreme Court put its reversal on the
ground that there had been an unlawful search of McDonald's
room.2 It is doubtful, then, that the McDonald decision has
altered to any great degree the law as expressed in the Brown case.
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Jackson put his deci-
sion on broader grounds. He said that the rights of one occupying
a room in a dwelling house have been violated when the integrity
and privacy of any portion of the house have been invaded by an
unlawful entry of the type there involved. It must be borne in
mind that the police entered the house in what the court looked
upon as a particularly outrageous manner; Justice Jackson des-
cribed it as a criminal intrusion on a plane with burglary. If the
Muscarelle, 63 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d 1933); Safarik v. United States, 62 F. 2d
892 (C.C.A. 8th 1933); Chepo v. United States, 46 F. 2d 70 (G.C.A. 3d 1930);
Nixon v. United States, 36 F. 2d 316 (C.C.A. 9th 1929); Coon v. United States,
36 F. 2d 164 (C.C.A. 10th 1929); Hardwig v. United States, 23 F. 2d 922(C.C.A. 6th 1928); Stakich v. United States, 24 F. 2d 701 (C.C.A. 9th 1928);
Graham v. United States, 15 F. 2d 740 (C.C.A. 8th 1926); Klein v. United
States, 14 F. 2d 35 (C.C.A. 1st 1926); Rouda v. United States, 10 F. 2d 916(C.C.A. 2d 1926); United States v. Vlakos, 19 F. Supp. 166 (D. Ore. 1937).
2183 F. 2d 383 (C.C.A. 3d 1936).
221d. at 386.
23166 F. 2d 957 (App. D. C. 1948).
24335 U. S. 451, 69 Sup. Ct. 191 (1948).
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McDonald decision is given its fullest effect by future courts, then
a roomer will have greater protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment than he previously had, but the facts in the McDonald case
will tend to limit its liberalizing effect.
In the second class of cases within this group the premises con-
sist of a building more or less open to the public such as a hotel or
store building in which defendant occupies one or more rooms.
Illustrative of this type is Rouda v. United States" where defend-
ants occupied a basement room in a commercial building. Officers
followed one of the defendants into a store and down the basement
steps. Approaching an open door at the rear of the basement
they saw defendants illegally labeling liquor bottles. Defendants
were placed under arrest by the officers who subsequently procured
a warrant and returned to seize the liquor and other evidence from
the room. Before trial defendants moved to suppress the evidence
and quash the warrant, claiming that it was based upon informa-
tion obtained through an unlawful entry into the basement. In
affirming the trial court's denial of this motion the appellate court
conceded that there had been an unlawful entry into the basement,
but held that defendants were in no position to complain of this
entry since their rights were not violated. It seems clear that the
McDonald decision would not change the result reached in the
Rouda case. There are two important distinctions. First, the entry,
though unlawful, consisted of a mere trespass conducted in a not
particularly outrageous manner. Second, the building entered was
a commercial building and not a dwelling house.
In the third class the premises consist of a tract of land on
which there are several structures and defendant occupies one of
these structures. Illustrative is Coon v. United States.2' The defend-
ant had leased a shack on the homestead of Mrs. Oldham. An
officer entered the homestead without a warrant, and after investi-
gating the Oldham filling station and the Oldham residence, went
to the defendant's shack. Smelling the odor of mash, he entered and
found the defendant operating a still. Before trial defendant
moved for the suppression of evidence, one of his grounds being
that the officer had illegally entered the Oldham homestead. The
court held that defendant's rights were in no way violated by the
trespass upon that portion of the homestead in which he had no
interest; further, the shack itself was searched upon probable
cause. Nothing in the McDonald case indicates that the law as
expressed in Coon v. United States has undergone a change.
2510 F. 2d 916 (C.C.A. 2d 1926).
2636 F. 2d 164 (C.C.A. 10th 1929).
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4. DEFENDANT DWELLS IN THE HOUSE WITH THE FREEDOM OF
THE HOUSEHOLD.
Two cases suggest that one who dwells within a house with
the freedom of the household may complain of an unlawful
search of any part of the house. In Brown v. United States" the
court held that the rights of the householder's daughter dwelling
on the premises were violated by an unlawful search of the house.
In the case of Alvau v. United States"8 the court held that the
rights of an employee dwelling within the house were violated by
an unlawful search of the house. 9 As stated above, the right
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is essentially the right of
privacy." It is therefore reasonable to say that the right of privacy
of one who has the general freedom of the household is violated
by an unreasonable search of any part of the house. Of course
if it appears that defendant was actually nothing more than a
roomer on the premises, not having the general freedom of the
premises, then he should be treated accordingly.3 It is then imma-
terial that he was an employee of the householder, or a member
of the householder's family.
The distinction drawn may seem narrow, but it is supported
by the words of the Fourth Amendment itself. That Amendment
gives protection not only to the houses of the people, but also to
their papers and effects. Adequate protection can be given to the
effects of a roomer if the room which he occupies is immune from
search, but if defendant has the freedom of the dwelling, then
his effects are likely to be scattered throughout the house, and can
be protected only by guaranteeing to him the privacy of the whole
house and not only the privacy of the room in which he sleeps.
5. DEFENDANT Is AN EMPLOYEE, GUEST, OR CASUAL VISITOR
ON THE PREMISES.
One who was on the premises searched merely as an employee,
guest or casual visitor may not complain of an unlawful search
of the premises. 2 In the principal case of McDonald v. United
2783 F. 2d 383 (C.C.A. 3d 1936).
2833 F. 2d 467 (C.C.A. 9th 1929).
29Caveat: The Brown and Alvau cases merely suggest the existence of this
category to the writer.
3See note 19 supra.
31See Wida v. United States, 52 F. 2d 424 (C.C.A. 8th 1931);cf. Milyonico v.
United States, 53 F. 2d 937 (C.C.A. 7th 1931).
3Gibson v. United States, 149 F. 2d 381 (App. D.C. 1945); In re Nassetta,
125 F. 2d 924 (C.O.A. 2d 1942); United States v. Dellaro, 99 F. 2d 781 (C.C.A.
2d 1938); Mello v. United States, 66 F. 2d 135 (C.C.A. 3d 1933); United
19493
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States, the defendant Washington was merely a guest on the
premises. The court in its opinion assumed without deciding that
his constitutional rights had not been volated and reversed his
conviction on other grounds."
If such person is to claim the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment he must show that the property seized belonged to him,"4 was
in his possession,35 or was taken from his person." The require-
ment of possession in this regard is not necessarily satisfied by
merely showing that defendant had actual control over the prop-
erty. Control may be termed mere custody-especially if defendant
was an employee. There is an interesting contradiction here in
view of the fact that mere custody may not be sufficient to entitle
a party to object to unlawful seizure, while at the same time it
may be sufficient to satisfy an indictment for illegal possession of
the property."
It is submitted that one casually on the premises is sufficiently
protected under the Fourth Amendment if his person is protected
from unlawful search, and his papers and effects are protected
from unlawful seizure.
States v. Muscarelle, 63 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d 1933); Kelly v. United States,
61 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 8th 1932); United States v. Crushiata, 59 F. 2d 1007
(C.C.A. 2d 1932); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); United
States v. De Vasto, 52 F. 2d 26 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); United States v. Messina,
36 F. 2d 699 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); United States v. Vlakos, 19 F. Supp. 166 (D.
Ore. 1937); United States v. Gass, 17 F. 2d 996 (M.D. Pa. 1927); United
States v. Mandel, 17 F. 2d 270 (D. Mass. 1927). See United States v. Cono-
scente, 63 F. 2d 811 (C.C.A. 2d 1933); Occinto v. United States, 54 F. 2d 351
(C.C.A. 8th 1931); Wida v. United States, 52 F. 2d 424 (C.C.A. 8th 1931);
Cantrell v. United States, 15 F. 2d 953 (C.C.A. 5th 1926). Cf. United States v.
Salli, 115 F. 2d 292 (C.C.A. 2d 1940); Rossi v. United States, 60 F. 2d 955
(C.C.A. 7th 1932); The Evelyn, 2 F. Supp. 911 (D. NJ. 1933).
s3See category (10) on co-defendants, infra. One may wonder at the possible
effect of Justice Jackson's remark that "... . even a guest may expect the shelter
of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." 335 U. S. 451, 461, 69
Sup. Ct. 191, 196 (1948). Perhaps if this court had been forced to decide the
question, it would have concluded that Washington's rights had been violated.
34United States v. Stappenback, 61 F. 2d 955 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Pielow v.
United States, 8 F. 2d 492 (C.C.A. 9th 1925); United States v. De Bousi,
32 F. 2d 902 (D. Mass. 1929).
35See United States v. Stappenback, 61 F. 2d 955 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Pielow v.
United States, 8 F. 2d 492 (C.C.A. 9th 1925).
36Hagen v. United States, 4 F. 2d 801 (C.C.A. 9th 1925). But cf. Kwong How
v. United States, 71 F. 2d 71 (C.C.A. 9th 1931).
37E.g., Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 8th 1932); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932).
38Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 8th 1932); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); United States v. Messina, 36 F. 2d
699 (C.C.A. 2d 1929). Cf. Graham v. United States, 15 F. 2d 740 (C.C.A. 8th
1926); United States v. Shelton, 59 F. Supp. 273 (D. Ky. 1945).
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6. DEFENDANT HAS No CONNECTION WITH THE PREMISES
SEARCHED BUT DOES HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
SEIZED.
Where property in which the defendant had an interest was
seized from premises with which he had no connection at all,
or from a public place, he may still complain of the seizure
though not of the sedrch. The cases do not show too clearly,
however, what sort of interest the defendant must have in the
property seized in order to show that his rights were violated.
So far as the writer can determine, the defendant must show legal
title39 and possession40 of the property seized. This requirement
is satisfied if another was merely holding custody on behalf of the
defendant. 1
In Lewis v. United States" a memorandum book was seized
from the defendant's suitcase in a hotel storeroom. The court
held that the defendant could not question the legality of the
seizure because he admitted that the book did not belong to him.
One may question the reasonableness of the court's requirement
of legal title in the Lewis case. While it is true that defendant did
not own the book, still he did own the suitcase and had the right
to expect that the privacy of that suitcase be respected by all, in-
cluding the police.
7. DEFENDANT'S PERSON IS SEARCHED DURING THE COURSE OF
AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH.
In the event that defendant did not have a legally protected
interest in the premises searched or the property seized, may he
still move for the suppression of the evidence seized, if he can show
that his person was searched during the course of the unlawful
search? This interesting question seems never to have been
answered by the federal courts,4" but suppose the following case
39Lewis v. United States, 92 F. 2d 952 (C.C.A. 10th 1937). See Hurwitz v.
United States, 299 Fed. 449 (C.C.A. 8th 1924); Tsuie Shee v. Backus, 243 Fed.
551 (C.C.A. 9th 1917). Cf. Schenck ex tel. Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F.
Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1938).
40United States v. One Ford Truck, 46 F. 2d 171 (S.D. Texas 1930); United
States v. One Gardner Roadster, 35 F. 2d 777 (W.D. Wash. 1929); United
States v. One Buick Automobile, 21 F. 2d 789 (D. Vt. 1927). Cf. United States
v. Reiburn, 127 F. 2d 525 (C.C.A. 2d 1942); Davis v. United States, 138 F. 2d
406 (C.C.A. 5th 1943).
4 1United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. N.Y.
1943); See syllabus 3 of Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877). Cf. Pielow v.
United States, 8 F. 2d 492 (C.C.A. 9th 1925).
4292 F. 2d 952 (C.C.A. 10th 1937).
43See Kwong How v. United States, 71 F. 2d 71 (C.C.A. 9th 1931); Nelson v.
United States, 18 F. 2d 522 (C.C.A. 8th 1927); Schenckexrel. Chow Fook Hong
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were to arise: Federal officers, suspecting gambling, enter the
garage of Jones where he and several of his friends are sitting
about talking. Without a warrant or probable cause the officers
search all of the men and find nothing. They then search the
garage and find gambling pharaphernalia belonging to Jones hid-
den in the rear of the garage. Before trial may any or all of
Jones' friends move to suppress in evidence the gambling para-
phernalia on the ground that his person was searched during the
course of the unlawful search? The writer believes that any one
should be in a position to make the motion. It is true that his
property rights were not violated, but the right of each to the
sanctity and privacy of his person was violated. This of all the
guarantees of the Constitution should be most highly respected
by the courts.
8. DEFENDANT IS A CORPORATION OR AN UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATION, OR A MEMBER, STOCKHOLDER, OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE OF SUCH ORGANIZATION.
If the premises of a corporation or an unincorporated associa-
tion such as a labor union are illegally searched and property
of the organization is illegally seized, the organization may move
for the return and suppression of the evidence in its own behalf."
On the other hand, it is well settled that an individual does
not show that his constitutional rights have been violated merely
by showing that he was a member, stockholder, officer or em-
ployee of an organization whose rights were so violated. 5 This
v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1938). These cases indicate by way of dicta
that the defendant could not move to suppress the evidence under such circum-
stances.
44Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 185
(1920) (which definitely settled previous doubts about a corporation's having
protected rights under the Fourth Amendment); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 283 U. S. 244 (1931); Lagow v. United States, 159 F. 2d 245
(C.C.A. 2d 1946); In re No. 32 East Sixty-Seventh St., 96 F. 2d 153 (C.C.A. 2d
1938); McHie v. United States, 194 Fed. 895 (N.D. Ill. 1912). See Reeve v.
Howe, 33 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
45Lagow v. United States, 159 F. 2d 245 (C.C.A. 2d 1946); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); United States v. De Vasto, 52 F. 2d 26
(C.C.A. 2d 1931); A. Guckenheimer & Bros. v. United States, 3 F. 2d 786
(C.C.A. 3d 1925); Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795 (C.C.A. 7th 1920).
See In re 14 E. Seventeenth St., 65 F. 2d 289 (C.C.A. 2d 1933); Bilodeau v.
United States, 14 F. 2d 582 (C.C.A. 9th 1926); Newingham v. United States,
4 F. 2d 490 (C.C.A. 3d 1925); United States v. Wainer, 49 F. 2d 789 (W.D. Pa.
1931). Cf. Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 43 Sup. Ct. 514
(1923); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, 33 Sup. Ct. 158 (1913);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538 (1911); Hale v. Henkel
201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370 (1906). But see Ex parte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110,
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is true though the defendant was the sole stockholder of the cor-
poration in question.48 There is some support for the proposition
that officers and employees of a corporation will be able to com-
plain if at the time the search was made corporate property was
seized from their actual physical control,47 or their persons were
searched,4" or their individual property was also seized.49 This
would seem sound. One does not show a violation of his rights
merely because he is connected with a corporation whose rights
were violated, but on the other hand, one should not lose the
protection which the Constitution extends to him as an individual
merely because he was connected with a corporation."
9. DEFENDANT DIsCLAIMS INTEREST.
Often it occurs that a defendant, in order to avoid the incrimi-
nating effect of evidence seized, will disclaim any interest in the
premises searched or the property seized. It is well settled that in
such a case he will not be allowed to raise the issue of the legality
of the search and seizure whatever his true relationship to the
premises searched and the property seized."' The courts have not
(D. Mont. 1920) (where the court was particularly influenced by the manner in
which the search was conducted, as was the court in the principal case.)
46"There are occasions when the courts will pierce the veil of a corporate
entity, but that is done not for the benefit of the persons who organized the
corporation, but for the purpose of protecting the rights of third persons, and
then only in exceptional instances." United States v. Lagow, 66 F. Supp. 738,
739 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
4 7See Reeve v. Howe, 33 F. Supp. 619, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1940) where the
court said, ". . .dispassionate reasoning must concede that the duly constituted
corporate officer, having books, papers, records, money, and other property
committed to his care for the proper use of which, within the scope of corporate
powers he is personally responsible, has a 'right' therein and thereto." See also
Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); United States v. De
Vasto, 52 F. 2d 26 (C.C.A. 2d 1931).
4See in this connection: Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S.
344, 51 Sup. Ct. 151 (1931).
49Ibid.; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup.
Ct. 185 (1920).
s0See United States v. Ebeling, 146 F. 2d 254 (C.C.A. 2d 1944) where the
court said that defendant had no right to complain of the seizure of papers
seized when his desk was rifled by federal officers, because the desk belonged
to the company for which he worked. This is absurd. His right of privacy would
have been no more violated if he had had title to the desk.
51Gowling v. United States, 64 F. 2d 796 (C.C.A. 6th 1933); Rossi v. United
States, 60 F. 2d 955 (C.C.A. 7th 1932); United States v. Lee Hee, 60 F. 2d
924 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Shore v. United States, 49 F. 2d 519 (App. D.C. 1931);
Chepo v. United States, 46 F. 2d 70 (C.C.A. 3d 1930); McMillan v. United
States, 26 F. 2d 58 (C.C.A. 8th 1928); Rosenberg v. United States, 15 F. 2d
179 (C.C.A. 8th 1926); Schenck exrel Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp.
776 (D. Mass. 1938); United States v. Harnish, 7 F. Supp. 305 (D. Me. 1934);
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set forth the rationale behind this rule. Perhaps it may be ex-
plained on the ground that defendant will not be permitted to as-
sume two contradictory positions at the same time, i. e., disclaim all
interest in order to avoid conviction, yet claim interest in order
to move for suppression. The only difficulty with this explanation
is that if it applies to the defendant it should apply with equal
force to the government which occupies the reverse of the same
dual position.2 Probably the true basis for the rule lies in the
fundamental hostility of courts to the exclusion of evidence, even
though wrongfully seized. It is questionable whether this is a
proper basis for such an inroad on the federal exclusion rule. It
would seem more desirable for the trial court, when the issue is
raised, to investigate the facts to determine if the defendant's
rights actually were violated, considering the disclaimer as merely
one piece of evidence against him. It the court finds as a matter
of fact that defendant's rights were violated, the evidence should
be suppressed.
Somewhat analogous to the disclaimer rule is a rule of plead-
ing which has developed in this class of cases. When defendant
comes before the court in order to petition for a return and sup-
pression of the property seized, he must set out with directness
and clarity his true relation to the premises searched and/or
property seized. 3 In Connolly v. Medalie" Justice Learned Hand
said: "Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners,
United States v. 185 Cases Scotch Whiskey, 15 F. 2d 563 (D. R.I. 1926). See
Ingram v. United States, 113 F. 2d 966 (C.C.A. 9th 1940); Creech v. United
States, 97 F. 2d 390 (C.C.A. 5th 1938); Lewis v. United States, 92 F. 2d 952(C.C.A. 10th 1937); Patterson v. United States, 31 F. 2d 737 (C.C.A. 9th 1929);
Driskill v. United States, 281 Fed. 146 (C.C.A. 9th 1922); But cf. Cofer v.
United States, 37 F. 2d 677 (C.C.A. 5th 1930); United States v. Dean, 50
F. 2d 905 (D. Mass. 1931).
52
"The only special circumstance in the present case which calls for notice
is that Dean at first claimed to the officers that he had leased the garage and
did not have present possession or control of it. The government contends that
he is not, therefore, in a position to question the legality of the search. The
indictment, however, involves an assertion that the property was in the pos-
session or control of Dean. The government cannot maintain that he was the
owner of the property for the purpose of convicting him and was not the owner
for the purpose of searching it." United States v. Dean, 50 F. 2d 905, 906
(D. Mass. 1931).
53Brown v. United States, 61 F. 2d 363 (C.C.A. 8th 1932); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Kelleher v. United States, 35 F. 2d
877 (App. D.C. 1929); Chicco v. United States, 284 Fed. 434 (C.C.A. 4th
1922); United States v. Shelton, 59 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Ky. 1945); United
States v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. N.Y. 1941); United States v. Gass,
14 F. 2d 229 (D. Pa. 1926). See Belcher v. United States, 50 F. 2d 573 (C.C.A.
8th 1931); Nunes v. United States, 23 F. 2d 905 (C.C.A. 1st 1928); Armstrong
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or in possession of contraband property, may wish at once to se-
cure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part,
but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must
take on that role with enough detail to cast them without ques-
tion. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament, but
they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma."55 The
reasonableness of this requirement seems apparent. If the court
must determine whether or not defendant's rights were violated,
it deserves, at least, a true statement of defendant's position.
10. DEFENDANT Is BEING TRIED WITH ONE WHOSE RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED.
Until the decision in the principal case the rule was well estab-
lished that a defendant had no right to demand the suppression
of evidence in his own behalf merely because he was being tried
jointly with another whose rights under the Fourth Amendment
had been violated.56 Apparently it was not considered material
that he would be prejudiced by the admission of the evidence in
question, for even a casual reading of the cases will show that
he usually was prejudiced by its admission. In Agnello v. United
States " a conviction of one of several defendants was reversed
on the ground that certain evidence had been illegally seized from
him. The court affirmed the convictions of the others saying that
they had not been prejudiced by its admission. The case has not
v. United States, 16 F. 2d 62 (C.C.A. 9th 1926); Lewis v. United States, 6 F. 2d
222 (C.C.A. 9th 1925); United States v. Murray, 17 F. 2d 276 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
But cf. Simmons v. United States, 18 F. 2d 85 (C.C.A. 8th 1927).
5458 F. 2d 629, 630 (C.C.A. 2d 1932).
55For an example of an extraordinarily frank pleading see Coon v. United
States, 36 F. 2d 164 (C.C.A. 10th 1929).56Hall v. United States, 150 F. 2d 281 (C.C.A. 5th 1945); Gibson v. United
States, 149 F. 2d 381 (App. D.C. 1945); In re Nassetta, 125 F. 2d 924 (C.C.A.
2d 1942); Bushouse v. United States, 67 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 6th 1933); United
States v. De Vasto, 52 F. 2d 26 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); Cofer v. United States,
37 F. 2d 677 (C.C.A. 5th 1930); Brooks v. United States, 8 F. 2d 593 (C.C.A.
9th 1925); A. Guckenheimer & Bros. v. United States, 3 F. 2d 786 (C.C.A. 3d
1925); MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769 (C.C.A. 6th 1924); United
States v. Olmstead, 7 F. 2d 760 (W.D. Wash. 1925); United States v. Wexler,
4 F. 2d 391 (S.D. N.Y. 1925). See United States v. Park Avenue Pharmacy Inc.,
56 F. 2d 753 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Todd v. United States, 48 F. 2d 530 (C.C.A.
5th 1931); Winslett v. United States, 43 F. 2d 358 (C.C.A. 10th 1930); Benese
v. United States, 25 F. 2d 231 (C.C.A. 5th 1928); Nielson v. United States,
24 F. 2d 802 (C.C.A. 9th 1928); Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F. 2d 582
(C.C.A. 9th 1926); Canada v. United States, 5 F. 2d 489 (C.C.A. 5th 1925);
Van Dam v. United States, 23 F. 2d 235 (C.C.A. 6th 1925); Schwartz v.
United States, 294 Fed. 528 (C.C.A. 5th 1923); Remus v. United States,
291 Fed. 501 (C.C.A. 6th 1923); Lusco v. United States, 287 Fed. 69 (C.C.A.
2d 1923).
57269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
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been taken by the lower courts to mean that a co-defendant may
object to the admission of evidence so obtained if its admission
would tend to prejudice him. Indeed the Agnello case has some-
times been cited for the broad proposition that a defendant could
not object to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the rights of a co-defendant.5"
The decision in the McDonald case may change the rule. It
was there held that the conviction of Washington should be re-
versed because he was prejudiced by the denial of McDonald's
motion to return and suppress. The court said that if the motion
had been granted and the evidence returned to McDonald, it
would not have been available for use in the trial of Washington.
While this was literally true, nevertheless the trial court could
have framed its order in such a way as to make the evidence
available against Washington at the same time that it ordered its
return to and suppression as against McDonald. 9 Or the trial court
could have denied the part of the motion which requested return
and merely ordered that it be suppressed in evidence against Mc-
Donald."0 The Supreme Court apparently did not take these two
possibilities into consideration when it said that the evidence would
not have been available against Washington had the motion been
granted. Perhaps the way is still open then for future courts to
follow the old rule that a defendant may not complain of the vio-
lation of the rights of a co-defendant. The writer suspects, however,
that this phase of the McDonald decision may lead to confusion in
the lower courts and that much judicial time will be consumed in
attempting to determine whether the rights of defendants are
prejudiced by the denial of his co-defendant's motion. It may
possibly lead to the practice of trying defendants separately in
such situations, an obviously undesirable result because of the
added time and expense involved.
58E.g., Bushouse v. United States, 67 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 6th 1933); Holt v.
United States, 42 F. 2d 103 (C.C.A. 6th 1930).
591n United States v. Lagow, 66 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. N.Y. 1946), the trial
judge granted the motion of the corporation to return and suppress the evi-
dence, but said that he wanted it clearly understood that he was not sup-
pressing in favor of the individual, and that as against him the evidence could
be subpoenaed.
6
°See the orders in United States v. Olmstead, 7 F. 2d 760 (W.D. Wash.
1925); United States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923). Rule 41(e) of
the Fed. R. Cr. P., 54 Stat. 688 (1940), 18 U.S.C.A. 687 (Supp. 1946) provides:
"If the motion is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to
lawful detention ..... (Italics supplied). The things seized in the McDonald
case were contraband and subject to lawful detention. See 22 D.C. Code 1502
(1940); 23 D.C. Code 304 (1940).
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